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REGULATION OF BusINESS-ROBINSON-PATMAN Acr-INJURY To CoM-
PETITION BETWEEN BUYERS OF AuTo PARTS-Petitioner manufactured and 
sold automobile parts to distributors who resold them to jobbers in 
interstate commerce. The products were classified into three lines: leaf 
spring line, coil action line, and piston ring line. A progressive, cumula-
tive discount was given in each line, based upon the aggregate yearly 
purchases of either a single buyer or a group-buying organization. The 
Federal Trade Commission charged petitioner with price discrimina-
tion in violation of the Robinson-Patman Act.1 Every customer who 
testified at the hearing denied that he had been injured competitively by 
the petitioner's pricing practices.2 Nevertheless, in view of the substan-
tial price differentials,a the small margin of profit4 and the highly com-
petitive nature of the trade, the commission ruled5 that the effect of peti-
1 Section 2 (a) of the Clayton Act, 49 Stat. 1256 (1936), 15 U.S.C. (1952) §l!l (a). 
2 The commission conceded that all of petitioner's other customers would so testify, 
if called. 
3 For example, of the 1200 purchasers of the coil action line in 1949, 79!1 received no 
:rebate at all, 352 received a rebate of only 5%, and the remaining 55 received rebates 
ranging from 7½% to 19%. 
4 Evidence indicated that a buyer's over-all net profit was 4%. 
5 Moog Industries, CCH Trade Reg. Rep. ,r25,444 (Transfer Binder, 1955). 
1032 MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 55 
tioner's pricing policies may be substantially to lessen, mJure, destroy or 
prevent competition between customers of the petitioner. On appeal, 
held, affirmed. There was substantial evidence from which the commission 
could properly infer the requisite injury to competition notwithstanding 
direct testimony to the contrary. Moog Industries v. Federal Trade Com-
mission, (8th Cir. 1956) 238 F. (2d) 43.a 
The principal case follows the doctrine established by the Supreme 
Court in FTC v. Morton Salt Company1 in holding that price differentials 
resulting from cumulative discountss granted to competing customers 
raise a presumption of substantial injury to competition. In that case, 
the Court held that a detailed inquiry into market effects of the price 
differentials was not necessary to establish prima facie a probability of 
6 In appeals by other manufacturers of auto parts, the commission's findings on 
similar facts of unlawful price discrimination have also been affirmed. E. Edelmann &: Co. 
v. FTC, (7th Cir. 1956) 239 F. (2d) 152; Whitaker Cable Corp. v. FTC, (7th Cir. 1956) 
239 F. (2d) 253; C. E. Niehoff &: Co., (7th Cir. 1957) 1957 CCH Trade Cas. ,r68,587. In 
the Niehoff case, the court suspended the commission's cease and desist order until the 
petitioner's competitors are subjected to similar orders, on the ground that the petitioner's 
business would be ruined if he were forced to refrain from discriminatory pricing prac-
tices which his competitors were permitted to use. 
The commission's enforcement procedures will be impaired if it must proceed separate-
ly against every member of an industry before an illegal practice can be stopped. The 
court's decision, in effect, calls for the establishment of Trade Practice Conference Rules 
with respect to price discrimination in the auto parts industry. Whether Trade Practice 
Conferences are an effective means of coping with particular problems should be left to the 
discretion of the commission and not determined by the courts. Moreover, a violation of 
a Trade Practice Conference Rule is not illegal per se and obedience to it can be com-
pelled only by the usual formal proceedings. The issuance of a cease and desist order 
against one member of an industry should serve as notice to other members of the 
industry who follow similar practices that they are violating the law and subject to 
appropriate action. The petitioner in the Niehoff case has a fairly effective weapon 
against his competitors who continue discriminatory pricing in his right to bring a treble 
damage action for injuries sustained. 38 Stat. 731 (1936), 15 U.S.C. (1952) §15. 
After judgment in the principal case had been rendered, petitioner, relying on the 
Niehoff decision, requested the court to hold its judgment in abeyance until its com-
petitors had been subjected to similar judgments. The court denied the motion, and 
thereby created a conflict with the Seventh Circuit. The United States Supreme Court 
granted certiorari, limited to the question of the denial of petitioner's supplemental 
motion. 25 U.S. L. Week 3277 (1957). 
7 334 U.S. 37 (1948). 
s While cumulative discounts are not unlawful per se, they have consistently been 
condemned. They do not necessarily reflect any actual savings in the cost of sale or de-
delivery and ordinarily are not functionally available to all customers. Similarly, cumu-
lative discounts based upon the combined purchases of a group of buyers with sales and 
delivery being made on an individual basis have regularly been held unlawful. See H. C. 
Brill Co., 26 F.T.C. 666 (1938); Simmons Co., 29 F.T.C. 727 (1939); Caradine Hat Co., 
39 F.T.C. 86 (1944); FTC v. Morton Salt Co, 334 U.S. 37 (1948); American Can Co. v. 
Bruce's Juices, Inc., (5th Cir. 1951) 187 F. (2d) 919. But see Kraft Phenix Cheese Corp., 
25 F.T.C. 537 (1937). See generally, "Symposium on the Robinson-Patman Act," 49 N.W. 
UNIV. L. R.Ev. 196, 237, 251 (1954). In the principal case, no attempt was made to cost 
justify the price differentials. The difficulties involved in cost justification are discussed 
in Dawkins, "Quantity and Cumulative Volume Discounts," UNIV. OF MICHIGAN LAw 
SCHOOL SUMMER INSTITUTE 109 (1953) .. See also Haslett, "Price Discriminations and Their 
Justification under the Robinson-Patman Act of 1936," 46 MICH. L. RE"'.. 450 at 463 (1948). 
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m1ury to compe'tition in the secondary line of commerce.9 A broader 
test based on market analysis has on the other hand, been employed in 
cases involving injury to the competitors of the seller.10 Although the 
commission applies the same standard of illegality, i.e., the reasonable 
probability of substantial injury to competition, to both primary and 
secondary line cases,11 the principal case renders it clear that in the latter 
situation the commission need not substitute a market analysis for the 
presumption of injury approved in Morton Salt.1 2 The commission in-
terpreted the buyer's testimony of lack of injury t? mean that the favored 
purchasers had not used the lower prices to undersell their competitors.is 
It is clear that the favored purchaser obtains a competitive advantage by 
virtue of his larger margin of profit14 even though the seller's price dif-
ferentials are not reflected in the resale prices.15 In the principal case the 
court did not specifically rely on this theory, however, but discounted 
the buyers' testimony on the ground that simple mathematics proved 
that the disfavored buyers were. injured.16 The court's refusal to give 
any weight to such direct and highly probative evidence as the testimony 
0£ petitioner's customers is questionable. Even though the large price 
9 Note 7 supra, at 46, 50. See also H. C. Brill Co., note 8 supra; Simmons Co., note 
8 supra; Caradine Hat Co., note 8 supra. 
10 General Foods Corp., CCH Trade Reg. Rep. ,i25,069 (Transfer Binder 1954); Min-
neapolis-Honeywell Regulator Co. v. FTC, (2d Cir. 1951) 191 F. (2d) 786, cert. dismissed 
344 U.S. 206 (1952). 
11 General Foods Corp., note 10 supra. 
12 In Minneapolis-Honeywell, note 10 supra, the court refused to apply a presumption 
of injury and found no injury to competition at the customer level attributable to the 
seller's price differentials, because the price of the seller's control unit was only a small 
portion of the cost of the finished product sold by the purchasers. Perhaps Minneapolis-
Honeywell can be viewed as a type of fact situation to which Morton Salt is inapplicable. 
It has been consistently held, however, that the fact that the price differential affects 
items which constitute only a small part of one's business is immaterial (see note 16 infra) 
and it would seem that this principle should also apply to cases where the item is bought 
not for resale, but for purposes of incorporating it into a new product. Perhaps this is 
the explanation of Justice Black's dissent. Minneapolis-Honeywell, note 10 supra, at 213. 
In adopting a market analysis approach, Minneapolis-Honeywell represents at most only 
a departure from the Morton Salt case and not a new doctrine. Thus, in applying a 
presumption of injury the principal case is in no sense returning to a former doctrine 
but is merely following what has always been the rule for secondary line cases, established 
in Morton Salt. But see Rowe, "Price Differentials and Product Differentiation: The 
Issues under the Robinson-Patman Act," 66 YALE L.J. 1 at 20 (1956). 
13 The buyers generally adhered to the petitioner's suggested resale prices. 
14 Russelville Canning Co. v. American Can Co., (W.D. Ark. 1949) 87 F. Supp. 484 
at 493 revd. for lack of proof of damage (8th Cir. 1951) 191 F. (2d) 38. See also Haslett, 
"Price Discriminations and Their Justification Under the Robinson-Patman Act of 1936," 
46 MICH. L. REv. 450 at 467 (1948). 
15 The mere existence of price differentials though not presently reflected in resale 
prices constitutes a threat to competition in violation of §2 (a). Com Products v. FTC, 
324 U.S. 726 at 742 (1945). 
16 Each buyer carried many lines and thousands of items. If a buyer's testimony 
means that the petitioner's price differentials alone did not cause him substantial injury, 
then clearly this fact is no defense. The price differential is judged in the light of its 
cumulative effect if similar price advantages were also obtained from other sellers by the 
favored purchaser. FTC v. Morton Salt Co., note 8 supra; H. C. Brill Co., note 8 supra. 
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differentials, the small profit margins and the highly compet1t1ve nature 
of the business certainly raise a strong presumption of injury to competi-
tion, markets are complex and have peculiarities and countervailing factors 
which may negate the injurious effects of price differentials and render 
false the normal presumptions with respect to injury to competition.11 
Basically, it is a question of how much and what kind of evidence is 
required to rebut the presumption of injury1 s and to shift to the com-
mission the burden of proving actual or potential injury to competi-
tion by means of market analysis or other direct evidence. While the 
weight to be given to any particualr piece of evidence is a question for 
the factfinder, it would seem that direct testimony of lack of injury by 
those persons allegedly being injured should at least rebut the presump-
tion. Such testimony is potent and probative. If it is deemed insufficient 
to rebut the presumption, the court has in effect raised a presumption 
of law, not of fact. It seems neither reasonable nor just to sustain a find-
ing of substantial injury solely · on inferences based upon mechanical 
application of simple mathematics in the face of direct testimony to the 
contrary.19 It is submitted that Morton Salt recognized only the validity 
of a rebuttable presumption of injury, and that it does not authorize the 
view taken by the principal case to the effect that injury is conclusively 
established once there is proof of a substantial price differential between 
competing buyers of goods of like grade and quality. 
The principal case also raises some interesting problems with regard 
to the statutory requirement of like grade and quality. The individual 
auto parts cannot all be said to be of like grade and quality for they are 
neither physically identical20 nor functionally interchangeable.21 The court 
re~oned, however, that since the cumulative discounts were based upon 
the aggregate purchases of an entire line and not individual items, the 
price differentials resulted in unlawful discrimination whether the in-
dividual items purchased by competing customers were interchangeable 
or not. While it was permissible for the commission to infer that competing 
customers did in fact handle similar items,22 it is to be questioned whether 
the commission and court should have held inadmissible petitioner's 
17 See Kraft-Phenix Cheese Corp., note 8 supra. 
18 In a few cases the defendant has succeeded in rebutting the presumption of injury. 
Kraft-Phenix Cheese Corp., note 8 supra; Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Co. v. FTC, 
note 10 supra. For a general discussion of the difficulty of proving lack of injury, see 
"Symposium on the Robinson-Patman Act," 49 N.W. UNIV. L. REv. 196 at 204 (1954). 
19 See the dissenting opinion of Commissioner Mason, Moog Industries, note 4 supra 
at 35,555. 
20 Boss Mfg. Co. v. Payne Glove Co., (8th Cir. 1934) 71 F. (2d) 768; Hansen Inoculator 
Co., 26 F.T.C. 303 (1938). 
21 Bruce's Juices v. American Can Co., (S.D. Fla. 1949) 87 F. Supp. 985, 987, affd. (5th 
Cir. 1951) 187 F. (2d) 919 at 924, modified on rehearing (5th Cir. 1951) 190 F. (2d) 73 
at 74, cert. dismissed 342 U.S. 875 (1951); Sylvania Elec. Products, Inc., CCH Trade Reg. 
Rep. ,r25,181; i]25,197 (1953); E. Edelmann & Co. CCH Trade Reg. Rep. ,r25,445 (1954). 
22 In situations where the purchasers buy only a few of the items in each line, it 
would be illogical to presume that competing customers did in fact carry competing items. 
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evidence that competing buyers did not in fact carry the same or inter-
changeable items. The mere fact that a seller establishes separate lines 
should not conclusively prove that the individual items within each line 
are sufficiently comparable to come within the terms of the statute. 
A. Duncan Whitaker, S.Ed. 
